Quarterhorse in Vietnam

1st SQUADRON

4th CAVALRY

QUARTERHORSE

1/4 Cavalvry After Action Report - DALLAS - 13 Jun 67


 
                                  DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
                          HEADQUARTERS 1ST SQUADRON 4TH CAVALRY
                                 APO San Francisco 96345
AVDB-QH3	                                                 13 June 1967

SUBJECT:	Combat After Action Report (OP DALLNS)

TO:  Commanding General
     1st Infantry Division
     ATTN: ACofS, G-3
     APO US Forces 96345



1.	REFERENCE: OPORD 12-67 (OPERATION DALLAS) Hq 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div, dtd 1
May 1967.

2.	DATES OF OPERATION: 16 May to 22 May 1967.

3.	GENERAL: The 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry (+) was under the operational 
control of the 1st Bde during the entire operation. The 1st Squadron, 4th Cavalry 
conducted road clearing and security, convoy escort, security of FSB A, and 
limited S&D operations in AO Dragoon .

	a.	Reporting Officer: LTC Thomas W. Fife
	
	b.	Task Org:
	
		Hq Trp		CPT George S. Moffitt
		Trp A		CPT Charles B. Fegan
		Trp B	.	CPT James Skillings
		Trp C		CPT William G. Yarborough
		Trp D		MAJ Robert E. Oberg
                  (DS of Div and/or Brigades throughout the operation)
		Co A 2/2 Inf (Mech)  CPT James Hill
		2 Plt a/5/2 Arty (AWSP)	LT Hines

4.	INTELLIGENCE:

	a.	Intelligence prior to operation: Intelligence prior to the 
beginning of Operation DALLAS indicated the presence of the 273d Viet Cong Main 
Force Regiment . The Dong Mai Battalion was also reported in the operational 
area with subsequent reports of the 58th Viet Cong Battalion and sector 
companies either within. the operational area or area of influence.

	b.	The terrain in the squadron area of operations during Operation 
DALLAS was generally sandy with mixed gravel and laterite surfaced roads. There 
were both jungle and rubber tree groves in the area. The jungle was generally 
dense single canopy with limited visibility. The weather was exceptionally dry 
for the monsoon season and had no adverse effect on the conduct of operations.

	c.  Fortifications: With the exception of a 30 bunker base camp only small 
fortifications of 3 to 4 bunkers  were found .
	
5.	MISSION:	Escort Arty to FSB A and secure it by 161300 May;
sweep and secure Route 16 daily in sector; conduct S & D operations in assigned 
AO; provide convoy escort as required.

6.	CONCEPT OF OPERATION:

	a.	Trp A - clear and secure route from FSB A to CP 0.

	b.	Trp B (-) with a platoon of A 2-.2 Inf (mech) atch -. move from 
Phu Loi to CP; clear route from CP 0 north in sector; S&D AO Joyce on order.

	c.	Trp C - clear and secure route from CP 0 to FSB B; secure engineer 
work parties.

	d.	Co A 2-2 Inf (Mech) (-) with one platoon of Btry A 5/2 Arty (AOSP) 
atchd - Secure FSB A; S&D in AO Jackie.

7.	EXECUTION:

	a.	15-16 May 1967: The 1st Brigade operation order was received by this 
headquarters on the 15th of May. That eveing the orders group gathered in the squadron 
conference room and verbal orders were issued. On the 18th of May, the squadron moved 
from Phu Loi and escorted Artillery and Engineer units to FSB A (XT255250). It secured 
FSB A with Trp A and Co A 2/2 Inf and established a field CP at  XT926285. Two booby 
trapped hasty road blocks were removed by elements of Trp C on highway 16, vicinity 
CP 0.

	b.	17 to 21 May 1967: The 1/4 Cay secured FSB A; conducted road clearing 
operations on highway 16; convoy escort missions; and S&D opera-. tions in AO.

	c.	18 iv~y 1967: Trp B was fired upon with a RPG-2 causing minor damage 
to a tank and one US WIA .  Artillery and air strikes were placed on the suspected 
enemy location and blood trails were found in the area during the subsequent search.  
S & D operation was conducted in AO Jackie resulting in the capture of the following 
equipment: 2 Chinese grenades, one bundle of paper work, 2 books, 1 blood stained 
diary, 10 lbs of rice. A base camp of 20 connecting bunkers was found and destroyed.

	d.	19 May 1967: Trp C was fired at with recoilless rifle and small 
weapons at XT007327, both rounds missed. A Troop C ACAV hit a mine vicinity XT017335 
resulting in 3 WIA and extensive damage to ACAV.  During the S&D operation conducted 
that day in AO Joyce the following enemv equipment was captured or destroyed; 2 105mm 
rounds, 4 AT mines, 3 bunkers, I CBU, 1 Base camp, 1 tunnel, 20 lbs of rice and one 
helmet .

	e.	20 May 1967: Trp B while conducting S& D operations in AO June 
captured or destroyed the following enemy equipment and/or facilities: 1 AT mine, 
2 hand grenades, 2 81mm rounds, 2 60mm rounds, 1 M26 grenade, 2 Chicom grenades, 
7 M79 rounds, 3 butterfly grenades with detonators, 2 butterfly grenades without 
detonators, 3 rolls of #1 wire, 3 bunkers, 3 Ho Chi Minh sandals.	

	f.	21 May 1967: Trp C while conducting S & D operations hit a mine 
at XT910305 causing 1 KIA, 2 WIA, and one ACAV destroyed. Another mine was hit 
at XT896362 causing one KIA And 5 WIA and one ACAV destroyed. At XT965280 an enemy 
booby trap killed one officer of Trp A and wounded another .

	g.	22 May 1967: Trp C while on route security mission hit a mine at 
XT891368 resulting in the combat loss of this tank. 5 enemy AT mines were located 
and destroyed in place at the same location.

8. SUPPORT:	Artillery units of the 1st Infantry Division Artillery provided 
artillery preparations and fire support on call.   7th Air Force TAC provided air 
support. Prep and strikes were both on call and preplanned.

9. RESULT:		US LOSSES			VC LOSSES
				
                           3 KIA	  		4 Base Camps destroyed
			  19 WIA         	       26 Bunkers destroyed
			   1 M48A3 combat loss          1 Tunnel
                           1 M48A3 damaged by RPG       2 Booby traps
                           2 ACAV combat loss          10  AT mines
                           1 ACAV damaged by RPG        2 Chinese grenades
                                                        2 105mm rounds
							1 CBU
							1 Hooch
							1 Helmet
						       30 lbs of rice
							2 Documents
							2 Books
							2 Hand grenades
						        2 81mm rounds
							2 60mm rounds
							1 M26 grenades
						        2 Chicom grenades
							7 M79 rounds
							3 butterfly grenades with det
							3 butterfly grenades without det
							3 reels of #1 wire
							3 Ho Chi Minh Sandals
	
10.	ADMINISTRATION MATTERS:
 
 	 a.	Administration and Logistical support was adequate

		(1)	Supply: Support of Class I, III and V was carried by troops 
as a basic load initially. Resupply was by road, with Phu Loi as the logistical base. 
Air transport was used for mail and critically needed parts .

		(2)	Maintenarice: All maintenance was adequate and support was 
well coordinated.

		(3)	Treatment of casualties: No unusual treatment problems occured.

		(4)	Communications: Constant effective communications were 
maintained at all times.

	b.	Personnel analysis:
	
		ORGANIZATION DESIGNATOR	INITIAL		TERMINATION
		  1/4 Cav: Authorized     930               930
                  Assigned                816               812

Above figures reflects squadron strength minus Troop D (Air) which was detached.

		  Present for duty	  780	            763

Figures do not include Troop D (Air) which was Detached.
	
		  Present in field    a.  591	            603
		                      b.  802	            810

Figures (A) are of Troops A, B(-), C and Hq Figures (b) includes A Co 2Bn, 
2 Inf and A 5/2 which were OPCON.

		  Present Base Camp: A Trp 14                37
				     B Trp 38	             50
				     C Trp 48	             14
				     HHT   59	             59
				     Troop D (Air) was detached.
	
11 	SPECIAL EQUIPPLENT AND TECHNIQUES:     None
	
12.	CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED:		

	a.	Conclusions: Omitted.

	b.	Lessons Learned:       Omitted. 

FOR THE COMMANDER:


				      /signed by
                                     WILLIAM F. MURPHY
                                     CPT, Armor
                                     Adjutant


After Action Report - BLUEFIELD - 19 Jun 67

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