Horseshoes with Charlie
On 22 February 1967 a gigantic military horseshoe was pitched into
the pit of War Zone C and the largest operation of the Vietnamese war was
underway. (See JUNCTION CITY I map attached) By evening of the 22d, a
casual observer flying over war zone C would have spotted settling dust
as the well-aimed horseshoe slid into place. That settling dust was a
direct result of mechanized, airmobile, and airborne forces of the US 25th
Infantry Division, the 173d Airborne Brigade and the BIG RED ONE. The
western and northwestern portions of the horseshoe were occupied by the
25th Infantry Division. The northeastern and eastern portions of the horse-
shoe were occupied by forces of the 1st Infantry Division and 173d Airborne
fantry Division and 173d Airborne
Brigade.
From MINH THANH the 1st Bn, 2d Inf, 1st Bn 26th Inf and 1st Bn, 28th
Inf conducted heliborne assualts in the north along route 246. From
QUAN LOI, the 4th Bn, 503d Inf and 1st Bn, 503d Inf of the 173d Airborne
Brigade under the operational control of the 1st Division, conducted
heliborne assaults in the northeast along Route 246. From BIEN HOA the
2d Bn, 503d Inf conducted the first battalion-size parachute assault since
the Korean War. Their drop zone was north of KATUM along route 246.
The eastern portion of the horseshoe was occupied by the 1st Sqdn, 4th Cav
with Co B, 34th Armor attached, the 2d Bn (Mech), 2d Inf and the 1st Bn, 2d
16th Inf. From 1st Sqdn, 4th Cav positions in the south to 1st Bn.
Inf positions in the north, 12 batteries of artillery thundered 105mm,
155mm, and 8 inch howitzer support. When all blocking units were in
position, search and destroy forces surgedd into the end of the horse-
shoe blocking forces in the north.
As those forces charged north, let’s consider some of the reasons
which brought about Operation JUNCTION CITY. In November 1966 the 1st
Infantry Division entered the southern portions of War zone C on Operation
ATTLEBORO. The operation yielded large stores of VC foodstuffs and
munitions and uncovered extensive logistical, administrative, and train-
ing complexes. In addition, forces of the 9th VC Division were encountered
in well fortified base areas. ATTLEBORO yeilded 1136 tons of rice
and 845 VC killed. If southern War Zone C was so productive, northern
War Zone C, along the Cambodian border, was probably an equally ripe target.
To confirm this, during the months of December, January, and early
February, a thorough evaluation was made of documents captured during
ATTLEBORO; a concentrated intelligence-gathering effort was focused on
War Zone C. Captured enemy materiel, documents, prisoners, and ralliers
indicated that both the Central Organization for South Vietnam (COSVN)
and the 9th VC Division Headquarters were located in northern War Zone C.
In short, the most logical pit for that giant horseshoe was northern War
Zone C.
The forces pouring into the open end of the horseshoe continued their
thrust northward. The 2d Bn, 28th Inf was helilifted into the area, and
in coordination with all forces around the horseshoe, conducted search
and destroy operations. On 28 February, just east of Route TL 4, Co B,
1st Bn, 16th Inf engaged two battalions of the 101st North Vietnamese
Army (NVA) Regiment. The brief engagement cost the NVA Regiment 167
killed. All units continued their missions, locating rice, supplies,
munitions, base camps, and training areas throughout the zone of operations.
As JUNCTION CITY entered its third week with only one major enemy
encounter and sizeable but unspectacular equipment finds, a prominent
news magazine in the United States asked its readers, "Whatever became of
JUNCTION CITY?" An answer developed as the BIG RED ONE prepared to charge
into phase II of JUNCTION CITY and encounter three additional regiments
of the 9th VC Division. However, before JUNCTION CITY I was finished
an additional major engagement took place. On 10 March 1967 the 2d Bn
(Mech), 2d Inf, minus Co B, was attacked at a fire support base along
Route TL 4 by the 272d VC Regiment. The attack was initiated by a heavy
30 minute mortar, recoiless rifle fire preparation, employing 120mm, 82mm,
and 60mm mortars and 57mm recoiless rifles. Near the end of the barrage
the enemy launched a two battalion ground attack on the eastern portion
of the perimeter, The attack met withering US caliber .50 and M60 machine
gun fire from armored personnel carriers and ground-mounted positions.
As the battle continued, mutually supporting artillery bases rained over
5000 rounds of artillery into the area surrounding the base being attacked.
Forward air controllers directed over 100 sorties of tactical fighter
support. The battle ended at 0500 hours. A police of the surrounding
area revealed 196 VC killed and five wounded PW’s. Friendly casualties
were three killed and 38 wounded. Only ten of the wounded required evac-
uation. One week later, the 1st Infantry Division terminated Phase I of
Operation JUNCTION CITY.
On 180001 March 1967 the Division initiated Operjation JUNCTION CITY
II. The area of operations was immediately east of the JUNCTION CITY I
area, extending into the eastern portion of War Zone C between KATUM and
Route 13. (SEE JUNCTION CITY II map attached.) This area was selected for
a number of important reasons. First, a CIDG compound and airstrip were
to be constructed along Route 246 west of AN LOC. Forces in the area would
provide security for engineer work parties. Second, this area was the
only remaining portion of War Zone C which had never before been searched
by US forces. In mid-February 1967, Operation TUCSON had covered the area
south of MINH THANH between the Michelin Plantation and Route 13.
JUNCTION CITY I covered the western portions of Zone C. To completely
blanket the zone, the JUNCTION CITY II area was selected. Third, intell-
igence gathered from documents, informers, ralliers, aerial observers, and
airborne radar indicated substantial VC traffic flowing northeast and
southwest in the same general direction as the SAIGON River, north of DAU
TIENG. JUNCTION CITY II was the last phase of a plan designed to sweep
through War Zone C in TAY NlNH province and to demonstrate to the VC that
an area they use as their major stronghold and headquarters for all South
Vietnam is vulnerable to entry by American forces. prior to this time no
American forces had ever operated in eastern war Zone C.
The plan for the second phase in War Zone C was quite simple: place
two brigades of infantry, reinforced with armored and mechanized forces,
across the flow of VC traffic. The 2d Brigade and 173d Airborne Brigade,
under operational control of the 1st Division, were chosen for the task.
They executed search and destroy operations in the general area, indicated
on the JUNCTION CITY II map, attached. The lst Brigade secured QUAN LOI,
Route 246 to the bridge site, and Route 245 to MINH THANH. the lst Brigade
of the 9th vision also under 1st Division controled Route-13
from LAI KHE to QUAN LOI. During this phase of the operation the lst
Infantry Division controlled five brigades and an armored cavalry regiment
in addition to supporting artillery, engineer, aviation, signal, and
logistical units.
Two significant enemy contacts occurred during JUNCTION CITY II. the
first took place at a destroyed village named BAU BANG, eight miles north
of LAI KHE along Route 13. At that location, the 3d Sqdn, 5th Cavalry
was securing B Battery, 7th Bn, 9th Artillery inside a perimeter of 20
M113 armored personnel carriers and six M48A3 tanks. At ten minutes past
midnight on 20 March the base came under heavy caliber .50 machine gun,
mortar, and recoiless rifle fire. At 0135 hours the perimeter came under
heavy ground attack from two battalions of the 273d VC Regiment reinforced
with local guerrillas. Heavy enemy machine gun fire was directed into the
perimeter from along a railroad track embankment 50-100 meters east of the
perimeter. Friendly forces replied with intensive, Sustained small arms
fires, M60 and caliber .50 machine gun fires, 90mm tank fires, 4.2 inch
mortar fires, 3000 rounds of 105mm, 155mm, 8 inch, and 175mm artillery fires,
coupled with 87 sorties of tactical fighter support. A police of the
battle area the following morning revealed 231 VC killed and three wounded
PW's. US forces sustained three killed and 63 wounded; 26 of the wounded
were evacuated. As in the 10 March battle, the ability of the mechanized/
armored perimeter to fight off repeated attacks kept the VC in position for
friendly artillery and air attack.
The second major enemy contact involved the lst Bn, 2d Inf, the lst
Bn, 16th Inf and the lst Bn, 26th Inf. On 30 March the lst Bn, 26th Inf
conducted a heliborne assault east of KATUM along Route 246. On the
following day, the lst Bn, 2d Inf landed in the same area. At 1255 hours
on 31 March, the reconnaissance platoon of the lst Bn, 26th Inf made
heavy enemy contact with an unknown VC force, Co B was sent to reinforce
the recon platoon and encountered caliber .50 machine gun fires, recoiless
rifle fires, claymores, and mortars, indicating a main force VC unit.
Extensive artillery and air strikes forced the VC to break contact at
1700 hours. All elements of the 26th Inf returned to night defensive
positions, dug in, and waited for morning. The lst Bn, 16th Inf (-) had
been helilifted into the area by 1730 hours to reinforce the position.
At 0500 hours on 1 April a heavy enemy mortar barrage began to fall into
the 16th and 26th Inf positions. The firing lasted for 15 minutes. lst
Bn, 2d Inf to the southwest also came under mortar attack. At 0522 hours
enemy ground attacks were launched from the north and east against the
26th Infantry. US ground forces returned a heavy volume of small arms
fires while artillery was massed on the east and air strikes delivering
anti-personnel bomblets and napalm in the north. The massive US response
broke the enemy contact. Immediate interrogation of a captured VC indic-
ated that the enemy reassembly area was to the east of the battle site. Air
and artillery were shifted into the area and followed by a sweep, employ-
ing the lst Bn, 2d Inf and lst Bn, 16th Inf. A total of 491 bodies were
counted in and around the defenses of the lst Bn, 16th Inf and lst Bn,
26th Inf. The final count after a sweep of the area was 609 VC killed
and three PW’s. friendly casualties were 10 US KIA and 64 WIA.
JUNCTION CITY I and II achieved very significant results. The
tabulated materiel results are attached as the last page of this narra-
tiave. Not all of the units participating in Operation JUNCTION CITY
had a chance to participate in one of these pitched battles. Those who
did made the VC pay dearly for the mistaken idea that they could overrun
a BIG RED ONE position. Other units contributed in other important ways.
The lst Engineer Battalion, for instance, constructed two new airfields
in War Zone C and erected a new bridge capable of carrying tanks across
the SAIGON River into the zone. Highway 13 was held open for military
traffic almost continuously for three months from SAIGON to QUAN LOI.
Most important, the lst Infantry Division and other US units marched
at will throughout the length and breadth of War Zone C destroying base
camps and gathering vital information. No longer can the VC regard this
area as a "safe haven". Incidentally Operation TUCSON from 14 to 22
February deprived the VC of 1700 tons of rice and JUNCTION CITY deprived
them of 311 tons more for a total of 2011 tons. That is enough rice to
feed 15 VC battalions of 500 men each for one year.
Most significant of all, four regiments of the 9th VC Division were
engaged in combat and resoundingly defeated. The 101st North Vietnamese
Army Regiment and the 271st, 272d, 273d VC Main Force Regiments lost a
combined total of 1203 combat soldiers killed in four separate battles.
That is a substantial chunk of the fighting strength of any division.
JUNCTION CITY permanently removed 1809 enemy soldiers from the field
of battle. The enemy wounded figure could easily be twice that number.
In the past two months the BIG RED ONE has dealt a staggering blow to
the 9th VC Division from which it will take a long time to recover.
"Whatever happened to JUNCTION CITY?" Ask Charlie; he may know!
Prepared by the
G-3 Section
1st Infantry Division
Operation JUNCTION CITY Totals
VIET CONG KILLED 1781
VIET CONG CAPTURED 25
VIET CONG RALLIERS ___3
TOTAL 1809
WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION
Arty Ammo 98 rds M79 Ammo 88 rds
Blasting Caps 1785 Mines 348
CBU 185 Mortar Ammo 519 rds
Demolitions 1179 lbs Pack How Ammo 25 rds
Det Cord 1600 m Small Arms Ammo 64,809 rds
Flares 1013 Small Arms 251
Grenades 4019
FOODSTUFFS
Beans 700 lbs Rice 311 tons
Dried Fish 10 tons Salt 8 tons
Milk 283 cans Sugar 75 lbs
Peanuts 200 lbs
EQUIPMENT
Air Compressor Drill 2 Oil 535 gal
Amp Meters 3 Oil Lamps 83
Auto Coils 3 Pencils 700
Auto Gears 5 Phones 23
Axes 2 Plastic Wpns Cases 82
Ball Point Pens 500 Radios 18
Batteries 6650 Reams of Carbon 10
Bicycles 127 Reams of paper 70
Bicycle Tires 200 Rulers 10
Bicycle Tubes 222 Sandals 7914
Bolt Threader 29 Sand Bags 586
Commo Wire 5 mi Sand Paper 8000 sheets
Copper Wire 6000 ft Saws 6
Drafting Kit 1 Screw Drivers 20
Drill Bits 50 Sewing Machines 5
Dynamos 2 Shovels 226
Electrical Resistors 100 Solder 17 spools
Electrical Wire 1825 ft Switchboards 2
Erasers 1750 Tap and Die Tools 50
Field Glasses 1 Tape Recorder 1
Generators 6 Tin 473 sheets
Generator Brushes 50 Transformers 4
Hacksaw Blades 254 Transistor Radios 38
Hand Drills 50 Truck Gears 8
Hand Grinders 1 Typewriters 10
Kerosene 300 gal Uniforms 716
Machetes 4 Water Pump 1
Med Supplies 637 lbs
Note: This is a copy of the original made by Bill Baty on 1 Mar 2001 using OCR.
My Thanks to Rick Nelson for submitting this report.