HEADQUARTERS 1st Squadron 4th Cavalry APO 96345 26 Apr 1967 SUBJECT: After Action Report (OP Junction City II) TO: CG 1st Inf Div APO 96345 ATTN: S-3 1. (C) OPORD 4-47 (OP Junction City II) Hq 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div, dtd 16 March 1967. 2. (U) Dates 18 March through 15 April 1967 3. General: Initially the 1/4 Cav under operational control of the 1st Bde moved to Quan Loi and with one Troop secured a portion of the Quan Loi perimeter and conducted road clearing operations and convoy security. Later in the operation, the squadron with three units under operational control conducted route clearing and security, convoy escort, security of Arty base at XT624814 and Arty base at An Loc. During the last period of the operation the 1st Sqdn, 4th Cav was under the operational control of 11th ACR. During this period the 1/4 Cav cleared and secured Hwy 13 in sector and secured the Arty Base at XT736816. a. Reporting Officer: LTC Thomas W. Fife b. Task Org: Hq Trp CPT George S. Moffitt Trp A CPT Rodney W. Symons Trp B CPT James Skillings Trp C CPT Jack Dice (Until CPT Glen Yarborough assumed Command on 15 April) Trp D (Air) MAJ Robert Oberg (opcon to Div or Bde's throughout The operation) 4. Enemy Activities: The Viet Cong Forces, elements of 9th VC Division and local forces in the eastern portion of War Zone "C" in Operation Junction City II conducted counter sweep action in limited force only. The actions were characteristic of those encountered in Operation Junction City I. 1st Sqdn, 4th Cav elements conducting convoy escort, route security and ready reaction force type missions encountered mines and RPG-2 and recoilless rifle fire but established no significant contacts. Two mortar and recoilless rifle attacks using M-70 or rifle grenade fire were launched against the 1st Sqdn, 4th Cav night perimeter which resulted in 1 WIA and no damages. The ineffectiveness of the Viet Cong fire was apparent during the first attack when almost all mortar rounds were outside the Sqdn perimeter, or were tree bursts. a. Weather: The weather conditions during Operation Junction City II were characterized by a warm humid atmosphere which contributed to occasional heavy early morning ground fog. b. Terrain: The terrain was dry and facilitated mobility throughout the operation. The dryness of the terrain did create severe dust conditions. 5. Mission: In conjunction with TF DIXIE, provide security for Quan Loi base and convoy escort along Rte 246 and 303. Be prepared to assist 173rd Abn Bde in security of Rte 245 20 March 1967. Op order secure FSP-E vic XT7882 on or about 22 March 1967. 6. Concept of Operation: 1/4 Cav with one troop under operational control secures Quan Loi Base and escort convoys along Rte 246. 7. Execution: 18 March 67: 1/4 Cav (-) moved to and secured Quan Loi. 19 March 67: 1/4 Cav (-) with Co. B 1/26 Inf and B 3/1 Cav (ARVN) attached conducted road clearing and security, and escorted convoys between An Loc - Minh Thanh & An Loc and CP14 (XT563843). 20-26 March: The 1/4 Cav (-) secured Quan Loi; cleared and secured road and escorted convoys between An Loc and CP14 (XT563843). 27 Mar to 12 Apr 67: 1/4 Cav initially with Trps A, C and one Inf Co. (Mech) and later with 3 Troops conducted road clearing and security, excorted resupply convoy, installation security and limited S&D operations in designated areas. 12-15 Apr 67: The 1st Sqdn, 4th Cav opcon to 11th ACR, cleared and secured Hwy 13 in sector and secured Arty Base at XT736216. 15 Apr 67: 1/4 Cav cleared and secured road from An Loc to XT765720 and escorted Artillery units from An Loc to Lai Khe. The 1/4 Cav terminated participation in Junction City II and moved to Phu Loi. Sqdn CP closed into Phu Loi at (unreadable) without incidents or enemy contact. There were no enemy contact of significance during Junction City II. The only casualties were due to enemy sniper and attack with recoilless rifles. (rest of para unreadable) 8. (C) Support: Artillery units of the 1st Inf Div arty provided artillery operations and fire support on call. 7th AF provided TAC air support. Prep and strikes were on call and pre-planned. 9. Results: US casualties: 2 KIA, 25 WIA US equipment lost: 5 M48A3 Damaged, 6 M113 (1 Destroyed, 5 Damaged) VC casualties: None Other VC losses: 14 AT mines 10. (C) Admin and Log matters: a. Admin and log plans were adequate. (1) Classes I, II and V were carried initially during Junction City II or basic load. (2) Maintenance: Maintenance was a serious problem during Junction City I, but was adequate during Junction City II. During Junction City I serious shortages of tank track and right and left front road wheel arms developed as a result of mine damage. The problem was kept within bounds through the conversion of intermediate road wheel arms into front road wheel arms by a complicated welding conversion. (3) Treatment of Casualties: The forward aid station and surgeon were with the squadron command group. Routine sick call was held and routine referrals were made in supporting medical company. There were no unusual routine or emergency treatment problems encountered. (4) Transportation: Re-supply was primarily effected by truck and proved to be excellent. (5) Communication: Excellent radio communication were maintained. Contact was retained with Phu Loi base station throughout both operations. (6) Medical Evacuation: Evacuation of routine medical problems were by supply vehicles or helicopters. Dust Off was used for day and night emergencies. b. Personnel analysis: ORGANIZATION DESIGNATION INITIAL TERMINATION 1/4 Cav Authorized 930 930 Assigned 955 931 PDY 821 821 PIF 510 515 Hq 83 82 A 22 11 B 30 28 C 16 33 D 160 152 11. Special Equipment and techniques: None 12. Conclusions and Lessons Learned: a. Conclusions: Omitted b. Lessons Learned: Omitted \signed for: by Thomas L. Silva David S. Kelly CPT, Armor Adjutant Note: This is a copy of the original made by Bill Baty on 13 Nov 2000 using OCR.