HEADQUARTERS
1st Squadron 4th Cavalry
APO 96345
26 Apr 1967
SUBJECT: After Action Report (OP Junction City II)
TO: CG 1st Inf Div
APO 96345
ATTN: S-3
1. (C) OPORD 4-47 (OP Junction City II) Hq 1st Bde, 1st Inf Div, dtd 16
March 1967.
2. (U) Dates 18 March through 15 April 1967
3. General: Initially the 1/4 Cav under operational control of the 1st
Bde moved to Quan Loi and with one Troop secured a portion of the Quan Loi
perimeter and conducted road clearing operations and convoy security. Later
in the operation, the squadron with three units under operational control
conducted route clearing and security, convoy escort, security of Arty base
at XT624814 and Arty base at An Loc.
During the last period of the operation the 1st Sqdn, 4th Cav was under the
operational control of 11th ACR. During this period the 1/4 Cav cleared and
secured Hwy 13 in sector and secured the Arty Base at XT736816.
a. Reporting Officer: LTC Thomas W. Fife
b. Task Org:
Hq Trp CPT George S. Moffitt
Trp A CPT Rodney W. Symons
Trp B CPT James Skillings
Trp C CPT Jack Dice (Until CPT Glen
Yarborough assumed Command on 15 April)
Trp D (Air) MAJ Robert Oberg (opcon to Div
or Bde's throughout The operation)
4. Enemy Activities: The Viet Cong Forces, elements of 9th VC Division
and local forces in the eastern portion of War Zone "C" in Operation Junction
City II conducted counter sweep action in limited force only. The actions were
characteristic of those encountered in Operation Junction City I. 1st Sqdn,
4th Cav elements conducting convoy escort, route security and ready reaction
force type missions encountered mines and RPG-2 and recoilless rifle fire but
established no significant contacts. Two mortar and recoilless rifle attacks
using M-70 or rifle grenade fire were launched against the 1st Sqdn, 4th Cav
night perimeter which resulted in 1 WIA and no damages. The ineffectiveness
of the Viet Cong fire was apparent during the first attack when almost all
mortar rounds were outside the Sqdn perimeter, or were tree bursts.
a. Weather: The weather conditions during Operation Junction City
II were characterized by a warm humid atmosphere which contributed to occasional
heavy early morning ground fog.
b. Terrain: The terrain was dry and facilitated mobility throughout
the operation. The dryness of the terrain did create severe dust conditions.
5. Mission: In conjunction with TF DIXIE, provide security for Quan Loi base
and convoy escort along Rte 246 and 303. Be prepared to assist 173rd Abn Bde in
security of Rte 245 20 March 1967. Op order secure FSP-E vic XT7882 on or about
22 March 1967.
6. Concept of Operation: 1/4 Cav with one troop under operational control
secures Quan Loi Base and escort convoys along Rte 246.
7. Execution:
18 March 67: 1/4 Cav (-) moved to and secured Quan Loi.
19 March 67: 1/4 Cav (-) with Co. B 1/26 Inf and B 3/1 Cav (ARVN) attached
conducted road clearing and security, and escorted convoys between An Loc - Minh
Thanh & An Loc and CP14 (XT563843).
20-26 March: The 1/4 Cav (-) secured Quan Loi; cleared and secured road and
escorted convoys between An Loc and CP14 (XT563843).
27 Mar to 12 Apr 67: 1/4 Cav initially with Trps A, C and one Inf Co. (Mech)
and later with 3 Troops conducted road clearing and security, excorted resupply
convoy, installation security and limited S&D operations in designated areas.
12-15 Apr 67: The 1st Sqdn, 4th Cav opcon to 11th ACR, cleared and secured
Hwy 13 in sector and secured Arty Base at XT736216.
15 Apr 67: 1/4 Cav cleared and secured road from An Loc to XT765720 and
escorted Artillery units from An Loc to Lai Khe. The 1/4 Cav terminated
participation in Junction City II and moved to Phu Loi. Sqdn CP closed into Phu
Loi at (unreadable) without incidents or enemy contact.
There were no enemy contact of significance during Junction City II. The only
casualties were due to enemy sniper and attack with recoilless rifles. (rest of
para unreadable)
8. (C) Support: Artillery units of the 1st Inf Div arty provided artillery
operations and fire support on call. 7th AF provided TAC air support. Prep and
strikes were on call and pre-planned.
9. Results:
US casualties: 2 KIA, 25 WIA
US equipment lost: 5 M48A3 Damaged, 6 M113 (1 Destroyed, 5 Damaged)
VC casualties: None
Other VC losses: 14 AT mines
10. (C) Admin and Log matters:
a. Admin and log plans were adequate.
(1) Classes I, II and V were carried initially during Junction
City II or basic load.
(2) Maintenance: Maintenance was a serious problem during
Junction City I, but was adequate during Junction City II. During Junction City I
serious shortages of tank track and right and left front road wheel arms developed
as a result of mine damage. The problem was kept within bounds through the
conversion of intermediate road wheel arms into front road wheel arms by a
complicated welding conversion.
(3) Treatment of Casualties: The forward aid station and
surgeon were with the squadron command group. Routine sick call was held and
routine referrals were made in supporting medical company. There were no unusual
routine or emergency treatment problems encountered.
(4) Transportation: Re-supply was primarily effected by truck
and proved to be excellent.
(5) Communication: Excellent radio communication were maintained.
Contact was retained with Phu Loi base station throughout both operations.
(6) Medical Evacuation: Evacuation of routine medical problems
were by supply vehicles or helicopters. Dust Off was used for day and night
emergencies.
b. Personnel analysis:
ORGANIZATION DESIGNATION INITIAL TERMINATION
1/4 Cav Authorized 930 930
Assigned 955 931
PDY 821 821
PIF 510 515
Hq 83 82
A 22 11
B 30 28
C 16 33
D 160 152
11. Special Equipment and techniques: None
12. Conclusions and Lessons Learned:
a. Conclusions: Omitted
b. Lessons Learned: Omitted
\signed for: by Thomas L. Silva
David S. Kelly
CPT, Armor
Adjutant
Note: This is a copy of the original made by Bill Baty on 13 Nov 2000 using OCR.